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Securities Regulation-INVESTMENT CONTRACT-COMMON ENTER-
PRISE-MORE THAN A SINGLE INVESTOR Is REQUIRED FOR A CONTRACT
To BE AN INVESTMENT CONTRACT CONSTITUTING A SECURITY-Le Cha-
teau Royal Corp. v. Pantaleo, 370 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
In Le Chateau Royal Corp. v. Pantaleo,' Emil Pantaleo agreed to
purchase three condominium units from Le Chateau Royal Corpora-
tion. The sales director orally assured Mr. Pantaleo that the three
units would be resold, for a mutual profit, prior to the closing date.
Relying on this promise, Mr. Pantaleo signed the three sales con-
tracts and paid a total deposit of $24,700; he did not apply for a
mortgage to finance the remaining purchase price. When the three
units were not resold prior to the closing date, Mr. Pantaleo refused
to close and filed suit to recover his deposits.' He claimed the right
to rescind the contracts on the ground that they were investment
contracts and thus constituted unregistered securities sold in viola-
tion of the Florida Sale of Securities Act. 3
The trial court ruled in Mr. Pantaleo's favor.' The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed holding that more than a single investor
is required for a contract to be an investment contract constituting
a security.5 In so holding, the court reaffirmed its earlier decision in
Brown v. Rairigh.5
In Rairigh, the defendant, Roger Brown, was a New York public
relations executive whose avocation was to breed, raise, and race
horses at the Pompano, Florida, harness racing track.7 On February
28, 1974, Brown sold to a friend, William Rairigh, a ten percent
interest in five race horses for $11,675, with the stipulation that
Rairigh was entitled to ten percent of the winnings, if any, and was
obligated to pay ten percent of all bills and stake fees. The agree-
ment further provided that if Rairigh was dissatisfied with the
horses' performance, he could resell his interest to Brown prior to
January 1, 1975.8 The horses failed to perform satisfactorily, and, in
fact, performed rather miserably, so Rairigh demanded the return
of his money. However, he failed to do so before the agreed cutoff
1. 370 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (reversed and remanded for consideration
of other issues).
2. Id. at 1156.
3. Id. at 1157; FLA. STAT. § 517.211(1) (1979) provides that the purchaser of an unregis-
tered security has the right to rescind the transaction upon the tender of the security sold to
the person making the sale.
4. 370 So. 2d at 1157.
5. Id.
6. 363 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
7. Id. at 591.
8. Id.
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date, and Brown accordingly refused to make any refund. Rairigh
sued Brown, demanding the return of his original investment on the
ground that he had been sold an unregistered security in violation
of the Florida Sale of Securities Act.9 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment for Rairigh, holding that
the definition of an investment contract as a security required more
than a single investor. 0
After the banking panic of 1907, many states passed laws to pro-
tect investors from unscrupulous promoters." These Blue Sky Laws,
as they have come to be known, 2 required that securities be regis-
tered with the state. '3 Contracts involving unregistered securities
are automatically rescinded." No proof of fraud or misrepresen-
tation is required. 5
After the stock market experience of 1929, both Congress and
Florida jumped on the Blue Sky Law bandwagon."5 Florida's Sale
of Securities Act, adopted in 1931, is a typical Blue Sky Law. 7 It
conforms almost perfectly with the Federal Securities Act of 1933's
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The Florida acts ex-
tended the definition of "security" by inclusion of such general
terms as "evidence of indebtedness, . . . investment contract, . ..
and interests in . . .a profit-sharing or participation agreement. ' 20
It remained for the courts, however, to define those general terms.
This note will concentrate on the development of the judicial defini-
tion of the term "investment contract."
9. Id. at 591-92.
10. Id. at 593.
11. See Note, State Securities Regulation: Investor Protection Versus Freedom of the
Marketplace, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 947, 947 n.2 (1977).
12. The phrase has been attributed to the opinion in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539, 550 (1917), which referred to "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so
many feet of 'blue sky."' Geiger-Jones was the first case in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutional validity of a state Blue Sky Law.
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (1979). It should be noted that certain kinds of security
transactions are exempt from the registration requirement. Id.
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.211(1) (1979).
15. See Note, supra note 11. The Florida Sale of Securities Act also contains anti-fraud
provisions which are available to investors regardless of whether or not the securities they
have purchased are required to be registered. Id. at 956-57. See also FLA. STAT. § 517.301
(1979).
16. See Note, supra note 11.
17. Ch. 14899, 1931 Fla. Laws 797 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 517 (1979)).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976).
20. FLA. STAT. § 517.021(15) (1979). The definition of "security" as including an
"investment contract" was incorporated into the Uniform Sale of Securities Act, which Flor-
ida enacted in 1931. Ch. 14899, 1931 Fla. Laws 797. Section 517.021(15), Florida Statutes
(1979) also lists specific items as securities: notes, stocks, treasury stocks, bonds, debentures,
certificates of interest in oil, gas, petroleum, mineral or mining leases. See also 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1) (1976).
CASE NOTES
The Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to address the mean-
ing of the term "investment contract" and to justify its inclusion in
the definition of a security. In State v. Gopher Tire and Rubber Co.,
the court held that the use of a general term furthered the legislative
intent of protecting the public from various 'get-rich-quick'
schemes calculated to despoil credulous individuals of their sav-
ings."' Therefore, the court refused "to lay down a hard and fast"
formula to determine whether a particular transaction was an in-
vestment contract subject to security regulation.2 The Gopher deci-
sion relied on the United States Supreme Court holding in Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., that the legislative intent of the Blue Sky Laws
was to "prevent deception and save credulity and ignorance from
imposition. "2
Until 1946, the term "investment contract" continued to be de-
fined on an ad hoc basis. However, in SEC v. Howey Co., 24 the
United States Supreme Court synthesized a definition of invest-
ment contracts which has come to be called the "Howey test." Al-
though the Court intended the definition to be a general guideline,
adaptable to a wide variety of circumstances,2 5 it has come to be
rigidly applied.
As divided into its constituent elements, the test finds an
"investment contract" in any scheme in which there is (1) an invest-
ment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation
that profits will be derived solely from the efforts of the promoter
or third parties. 2 The first element has rarely been an issue. Most
courts applying the test have relied upon an examination of the
facts strictly with regard to the third element. Thus, traditionally,
under the Howey test, the dispositive issue as to whether a transac-
tion is an investment contract subject to securities regulations has
been the extent of the investor's involvement in generating profit.Y
This devolves upon determinations of fact. 28
For example, the assignment of a fractional, undivided interest in
21. 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
22. Id. at 938.
23. 242 U.S. 539, 551 (1917).
24. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
25. Id. at 299.
26. Id. It must be emphasized that the Court itself did not separate the definition into
these three elements. Professor Loss, 1 L. Loss, SEculirrIEs REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961),
seems to get credit for the innovation.
27. See, e.g., Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu
v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (noncontributory, compulsory pension plans are not
investment contracts because there is no investment of money and no expectation of profits
from efforts of others).
28. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
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an oil lease was held not to be an investment contract because the
investors (assignees) were not relying solely on the assignors' efforts
for a return of their investment."5 The investors controlled opera-
tions to the extent of discharging one of the defendant assignors
when they became dissatisfied with his management of the prop-
erty3
On the other hand, distributor agreements wherein investors gave
money to the corporation in exchange for merchandise which would
really be sold by company salesmen were held to be investment
contracts since the investing "distributors" expected profits solely
from the efforts of others.3
In both Rairigh and Le Chateau, the Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal found that the investors expected a return solely
from the efforts of others. That finding would traditionally have
sufficed for the finding of an "investment contract" within the defi-
nition of a security.32 Recently, however, courts have begun to ex-
pand upon the second element of the Howey test requiring a
"common enterprise." There are two schools of thought as to what
constitutes a common enterprise. One emphasizes the economic in-
terest between the promoter and the investor and is called the verti-
cal approach.3 The other emphasizes the economic interest among
the investors and is called the horizontal approach. 3
29. Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 114 (10th Cir. 1959).
30. Id.
31. United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966).
32. See, e.g., Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu
v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). The Ninth Circuit has insisted that a common
enterprise "is one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties." Turner
Enterprises at 482 n.7. For a comprehensive discussion of the horizontal and vertical ap-
proaches to defining common enterprise see Moreno, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. MiAMn L.
R . 401 (1978). See also SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit
expressly accepted the Ninth Circuit's definition in Continental.
34. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972), was the first case to find that a transaction was not an investment contract on
the ground that there was no common enterprise. In Milnarik, the court used the horizontal
approach. The court held that the individual investor's discretionary commodity futures
trading account was not an investment contract subject to securities regulations because
there was no pooling of funds provided by several investors which was traded uniformly by
the broker for a common purpose. Id. at 278. The court emphasized that the investor-broker
relationship was more analogous to principal-agent than to investor-promoter. Id. at 277. See
also Blacker v. Shearson Haydon Stone, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
The facts of Blacker so closely parallel the facts in Milnarik, that the court simply quoted
and adopted the Milnarik opinion. It is possible that under a different set of facts the court
would use the Fifth Circuit's vertical approach.
CASE NOTES
In Rairigh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that under
either the horizontal or vertical approach, more than a single inves-
tor was required to constitute a common enterprise. 35 This may be
true under the horizontal approach, but it does not logically follow
from the vertical approach. The incapacity of the vertical approach
to necessarily imply that more than a single investor is required for
the "common enterprise" in an "investment contract" can be seen
by examining the primary cases upon which the vertical approach
is based.
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 6 a large number of inves-
tors were involved in a pyramid sales scheme. Basically, the inves-
tors not only earned money from marketing the product (cosmetics),
they also earned money for recruiting other investors. The recruit-
ment aspect of the enterprise was challenged as an investment con-
tract. The Fifth Circuit held that the recruitment efforts of the
investors were "nominal" and thus did not defeat the requirement
that expected profits be generated solely by the efforts of others 7.3
The investor's role was merely to get potential investors to attend
sales meetings organized and controlled by the company. The court
also held that the scheme involved a common enterprise. The court
adopted the vertical approach, stating, "Itihe critical factor is not
the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but rather the uni-
formity of impact of the promoter's efforts."8
A month later, in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.3' the
Fifth Circuit repeated that statement in finding that trading in
discretionary commodities accounts fell within the definition of a
security. In Continental, the broker gave individual advise to each
investor. The investments were not pooled. The court, nevertheless,
held that since each investor depended on the promoter's expertise
there was a common enterprise.' 0 The court stated, "the critical
inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments collec-
tively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise.""
In Rairigh, the Florida court relied on that language to conclude
that more than a single investor was required for a common enter-
prise."2 It was not the first court to do so.
In Sunshine Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp., the United States Dis-
35. 363 So. 2d at 593.
36. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. Id. at 485.
38. Id. at 478.
39. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 522. The court expressly rejected the horizontal approach used in Milnarik v.
M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
42. 363 So. 2d at 593.
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trict Court for the Southern District of Florida refused to find a
computer-lease agreement to be a security, stating that the common
enterprise element formulated in Koscot requires that there be more
than a single investor involved.'" In Sunshine, however, the plaintiff
failed two elements of the Howey test. Sunshine purchased comput-
ers from defendant Alanthus Corporation and leased the computers
back to Alanthus. Sunshine's motive, as stated in the complaint,
was to reap.the benefits of a tax shelter during the term of the lease
and to realize a return on their investment when the computers were
sold in the future." The court held that tax benefits are not profits
and that Sunshine was depending more on its own accounting pro-
cedures than on Alanthus's expertise. 5 As to the common enterprise
prong of the Howey test, the court used an analogy to a wheel: the
several spokes (investors) do not have to be connected with each
other, only with the hub (promoter), "but this does not mean that
a common enterprise may exist with a hub and only one spoke
'46
The Rairigh and Sunshine decisions are to be contrasted with
Huberman v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., in which the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California held that it
was "immaterial" that only a single investor was involved. 7 The
court defined common enterprise as "a common interest in the suc-
cess of the venture" shared by the investor and promoter. 8
More recently, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, in Troyer v. Karcagi,19 accepted Huberman
and interpreted the Koscot and Continental decisions as implying
"that a link between any single investor and the promoter is suffi-
cient to satisfy the common enterprise element of the Howey test." °
In Rairigh, however, the Florida court rejected the Huberman
definition, stating that it went "too far" and left the Howey test
without meaning.5 In propounding this statement, the Rairigh
court is implying that, under Huberman, a single investor is suffi-
cient for finding an "investment contract". 52 On the contrary, the
Huberman rationale merely says that a single investor is sufficient
43. 403 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
44. Id. at 720.
45. Id. at 722.
46. Id. Although the Rairigh court didn't cite Sunshine, appellant relied heavily upon it
in his brief.
47. 337 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
48. Id.
49. [1979] FED. SEC. L. Rzp. (CCH) 96,929 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1979).
50. Id. at n.7.
51. 363 So. 2d at 593.
52. Id.
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for finding a "common enterprise", but that there remain two other
important elements of the test which must be satisfied in order to
find an "investment contract."53
Perhaps the Rairigh court meant to say that if a single investor
is sufficient for finding a "common enterprise" then "the [common
enterprise element] set forth in the Howey test is meaningless." '54
The term "common enterprise" appeared for the first time in the
definition of an "investment contract" in the Howey decision it-
self. 5 The Howey Court expressed approval for its definition be-
cause "It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that
is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits." 6 Surely the Howey Court did not believe that
a single investor was any less susceptible to such "countless and
variable schemes" than, for example, two investors. The Howey
Court could not intend, by inserting the phrase "common enter-
prise" into the definition of an investment contract, to leave single
investors without the protection of the Blue Sky Laws. Yet, that is
precisely the result of the Rairigh and Le Chateau decisions. The
result is manifestly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's express
admonition in Howey that "the statutory policy of affording broad
protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and
irrelevant formulae." 57
The Rairigh court cannot be faulted for performing a rather strict
mechanical application of the Howey test; most courts which have
used it have done likewise. Ultimately, however, the application of
the Howey test must conform to the legislative purposes behind the
Blue Sky Laws. The United States Supreme Court held that "the
law is a regulation of business, constrains conduct only to that end,
the purpose being to protect the public against the imposition of
unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them.""
The problem, of course, is determining which schemes are
"unsubstantial." Implicit in cases such as Rairigh and Le Chateau,
is the policy issue concerning the extent to which the courts should
protect investors from possible fraud while protecting promoters
from the high initial costs of compliance with security registration
53. 337 F. Supp. at 1251.
54. 363 So. 2d at 593.
55. An excellent analysis has been performed by Professor Joseph Long on the federal and
state opinions which Howey relied upon in the formulation of its decision. Long, An Attempt
to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L.
REv. 135 (1971).
56. 328 U.S. at 299.
57. 328 U.S. at 301.
58. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
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requirements."9 The Florida Sale of Securities Act, however, pro-
vides statutorily for a number of exemptions from the registration
requirement." Thus, in resolving this policy issue the court should
more appropriately determine whether the scheme fits into one of
the statutory exemptions. The issue should not be arbitrarily re-
solved by assuming that schemes which attract single investors are
not large enough to warrant the cost of compliance with the law. The
Le Chateau decision opens the door for unfair condominium sales
practices.6 ' The same inducement which was offered to Mr. Panta-
leo to make him part with his money might now be offered to other
unwary individuals.
There is no valid reason for deciding to protect only "those hap-
less capitalists who are not alone in their misfortune.""2 Indeed, the
use of this arbitrary criterion does not really even simplify the prob-
lem of determining whether a transaction is an investment contract
subject to security regulation. What would happen, for example, if
the developer in Le Chateau sold options to purchase condominium
units to two different investors and was able to prove that there was
no pooling of funds for a common purpose? Would the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal find a "common enterprise" and therefore an
"investment contract" under the vertical approach, now that there
was more than a single investor involved? Or would the court refuse
to find a "common enterprise" and thus no "investment contract"
since the investors' funds were not pooled for a common purpose,
as required by the horizontal approach?
Under the Rairigh and Le Chateau decisions investors are left
uncertain about the extent of the law's requirements. Such uncer-
tainty is not good for the economy. It encourages neither entrepen-
urial inventiveness nor intelligent risk-taking.
The courts of Florida should be encouraging promoters to conform
to the statutory duties of fairness and disclosure rather than encour-
aging them to avoid these duties by developing investment schemes
which attract only an isolated, uninformed, and unprotected inves-
tor.
WILLIAM DEKLE DAY
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 517.081(6), .12(10), .12(5), .131, .141 (1979) which provide for
registration fees, bonds, and deposits.
60. FLA. STAT. § 517.061 (1979).
61. But see, FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (1979), which provides remedies and protections for
condominium purchasers.
62. Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding that
discretionary commodity trading account meets the common enterprise test even without a
pooling of funds).
